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Abstract  
 
What does the New Right want from international relations? In this article, we argue that the 
philosophy of the New Right is not reducible to a negation of internationalism. The New Right 
coalesce around a conceptualisation of the international driven by analytics and critiques of 
specific subjects, norms and practices, that should be treated as a distinct international theoretical 
offering. We refer to this vision as Reactionary Internationalism. This paper examines and locates 
this vision within the intellectual history of nationalism and internationalism by drawing on 
poststructuralist approaches to intellectual history and drawing evidence from a discourse analysis 
of recent Lega, Front National, Brexit and Trump campaigns. We find that, rather than advocating 
for the end of internationalism, the New Right seeks to reconstitute its normative architecture on 
the basis of inequality among identities. This entails dismantling Liberal economic and rights-
based norms and reframing them around transactionalism and power grounded on identity. 
Reactionary Internationalism emerges as a distinct philosophy that identifies a hegemonic 
normative bind and advocates its unravelling so as to liberate subjects understood as defined by 
their birth-cultural identity.  
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 2 
Introduction 
 
The idea that not all identities are or should be the same is very visibly on the ascendance. Carried 
aloft by growing populist movements these ‘new imaginings of what constitutes the ‘people’ and 
‘elites’’ are already having deep consequences for world politics.1 In recent years, theirs has 
become the most significant challenge to globalisation and Neoliberal economics,2 as well as “old” 
liberal international norms such as equality of rights for cultural, ethnic and gender identities, 
multilateral international agreements,3 rules-based international organisations and even limitations 
to the exercise of coercive power. Their recent electoral successes, taking the initiative within 
existing conservative movements, in the UK, US and France, or on their own as with the Italian 
Lega and Front National, have revealed remarkable coherence between their foreign policy 
objectives. 
 
These nationalist movements centre around a conceptual assemblage we refer to as the New Right. 
This set of political theories, which counts French author Alain De Benoist amongst its leading 
exponents,4 challenges the 20th-Century Liberal cosmopolitan vision of a singular humanity 
endowed with rights for all identities, races and genders, and the subsumption of conflict under 
multilateral institutions and trade. The New Right is the latest iteration of a reactionary challenge 
to Liberal belief in human universality by those that believe in fundamentally “natural” 
inequalities. It is defined by an internationalism of its own, which advocates linking nationalist 
movements to restructure international relations norms. To examine how these movements might 
affect international politics, we identify their ideas as a kind of alt-internationalism that has been 
disciplined and narrated out of the mainstream of IR. How, then, does the New Right reimagine 
the international and international relations?  
 
The answer lies in retrieving the New Right’s philosophical machinery through examination of its 
intellectual history, conceptual foundations and political discourse. Only then can its 
conceptualisation of the international be understood. The New Right has taken concrete shape over 
the last three decades. Though the term initially referred to 1980s electoral coalitions associated 
with Reagan and Thatcher, their “social conservative” wings, after initial alliances with 1980s free 
market radicals, found more independent expression in the 2000s and 2010s.5 In this paper we 
refer to this complex ideological ensemble as ‘New Right’ because this is the only term that they 
themselves agree on. We observe that in their –often incoherent and contradictory– expressions, 
groups that are described and self-label as ‘New Right’ (or ‘Alternative Right’ in America) share 
                                                 
1 Vedi R Hadiz and Angelos Chryssogelos, ‘Populism in world politics: A comparative cross-regional perspective’, 
International Political Science Review, 38:4 (2017), pp. 399–411. 
2 Angelos-Stylianos Chryssogelos, ‘Undermining the West from Within: European Populists, the Us and Russia’, 
European View, 9:2 (2010), pp. 267–77. 
3 Andrej Zaslove, ‘Exclusion, Community, and a Populist Political Economy: The Radical Right as an Anti-
Globalization Movement’, Comparative European Politics, 6:2 (2008), pp. 169–89. 
4 The link between New Right ideas and its theory is evidenced by Bannon’s, Lega’s and Le Pen’s explicit 
references to de Benoists’s work. See Le Monde, ‘Alain de Benoist en « soutien critique » à Marine Le Pen’,; 
Matthew N. Lyons, ‘Ctrl-Alt-Delete: The origins and ideology of the Alternative Right’, available at: 
{http://www.politicalresearch.org/2017/01/20/ctrl-alt-delete-report-on-the-alternative-right/} accessed 4 September 
2017; ‘Nuova destra: Alain de Benoist e Matteo Salvini - Paginauno’, available at: 
{http://www.rivistapaginauno.it/nuova-destra-lega-nord.php} accessed 10 August 2018. 
5 Joseph Lowndes, ‘“From New Class Critique to White Nationalism: Telos, the Alt Right, and the Origins of 
Trumpism”’, Konturen, 9:0 (2017), pp. 8–12. 
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a set of political sensibilities, theories and approaches to international issues. This paper locates 
the international political logics they share through analysis of their public discourse and their own 
key texts to make sense of the conceptual machinery that drives it. 
 
New Right politics have been extensively covered in the media and studied from the perspective 
of post-Cold War nationalism,6 fascist theory,7 Xenophobia,8 Nativism,9 nationalist Gender,10 
anthropology,11 electoral strategy,12 econometrics,13 and even charisma.14 These studies identify a 
continuity from 1930s ideas,15 and retrieve the role of 1990s culture wars,16 and late 2000s anti-
migration rhetoric.17 Among works exploring the conceptual mechanics of individual cases, 
Connolly analyses how American identities attached to Evangelical Christianity constituted a 
resonant discursive relationship with corporate interests.18 However, we suggest, this does not 
retrieve the international dimension that provides an equally or more important background 
condition.  
 
Probably due to its obscurity until Brexit and electoral victories in America and Europe, 
scholarship on the New Right remains limited to its 1990s anti-feminist impact,19 identity and anti-
                                                 
6 Lenka Bustikova and Herbert Kitschelt, ‘The radical right in post-communist Europe. Comparative perspectives on 
legacies and party competition’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 42:4 (2009), pp. 459–83; John B. 
Dunlop, The Faces of Contemporary Russian Nationalism (Princeton University Press, 2014); Jeffrey Kaplan, ‘Red 
Dawn is Now: Race vs. Nation and the American Election’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 29:3 (2017), pp. 411–
24; Anton Shekhovtsov, ‘Aleksandr Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism: The New Right à la Russe’, Religion Compass, 3:4 
(2009), pp. 697–716. 
7 Jean E. Rosenfeld, ‘Fascism as Action through Time (Or How It Can Happen Here)’, Terrorism and Political 
Violence, 29:3 (2017), pp. 394–410. 
8 Jens Rydgren, ‘Immigration sceptics, xenophobes or racists? Radical right-wing voting in six West European 
countries’, European Journal of Political Research, 47:6 (2008), pp. 737–65. 
9 Joel S. Fetzer, ‘Economic self-interest or cultural marginality? Anti-immigration sentiment and nativist political 
movements in France, Germany and the USA’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 26:1 (2000), pp. 5–23. 
10 Pamela Ann Abbott and Claire Denise Wallace, The Family and the New Right (Pluto Press, 1992). 
11 Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ethnicity and Nationalism: Anthropological Perspectives (Pluto Press, 2002). 
12 Nonna Mayer, ‘From Jean-Marie to Marine Le Pen: Electoral Change on the Far Right’, Parliamentary Affairs, 
66:1 (2013), pp. 160–78. 
13 Thiemo Fetzer, ‘Did Austerity Cause Brexit?’, p. 100. 
14 Roger Eatwell, ‘The Rebirth of Right-Wing Charisma? The Cases of Jean-Marie Le Pen and Vladimir 
Zhirinovsky’, Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 3:3 (2002), pp. 1–23. 
15 Roger Eatwell, ‘The extreme right and British exceptionalism: the primacy of politics’, The Politics of the 
Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream, (2000), pp. 172–192. 
16 Angela Nagle, Kill All Normies: Online culture wars from 4chan and Tumblr to Trump and the alt-right 
(Winchester, UK ; Washington, USA: Zero Books, 2017); David Neiwert, Alt America: The Rise of the Radical 
Right in the Age of Trump (London ; New York: Verso, 2017). 
17 Christian Joppke, ‘Beyond national models: Civic integration policies for immigrants in Western Europe’, West 
European Politics, 30:1 (2007), pp. 1–22. 
18 William E. Connolly, ‘The evangelical-capitalist resonance machine’, Political Theory, 33:6 (2005), pp. 869–886. 
19 Anna Marie Smith, New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality: Britain, 1968-1990 (Cambridge University 
Press, 1994). 
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migration politics,20 their electoral ‘mainstreaming’,21 post-communist nationalist resurgence,22 or 
post-guilt German reassertion.23 From an IR theoretical perspective, their study has been grouped 
under ‘populism’ or ‘Far Right’, focusing on their drive for sovereignty-first and anti-immigration 
approaches.24  
 
The New Right is thus commonly associated with a ‘withdrawal’ from international engagement.25 
We argue that it is not analytically sound reduce these movements to a symptom of decay in 
international relations,26 or to their anti-immigration sentiment.27 European Far-Right populists, 
who widely reference New Right thinkers like De Benoist, are ‘not persistently anti-
internationalist/anti-EU’.28 Our analysis suggests a relatively coherent programme for an 
internationalist future: a radical remake of internationalism as a normative architecture. This is not 
the reverse or negation of internationalist hope, but a doppelgänger, the latest iteration of an 
essential part of the history of internationalism. We call this set of ideas Reactionary 
Internationalism.  
 
‘[N]ot all internationalism was Liberal’, noted Jens Steffek.29 Significant ambivalence has always 
marked uses of the word. Kuehl divided internationalists into ‘community thinkers’, the ‘polity 
minded’, ‘socialists’ and ‘Liberal Internationalists’, which were in turn subdivided into those who 
analysed the term ‘conceptually’, or as ‘structure and process’. In particular, the nature and role of 
nations has been understood variously by discrete groups of internationalist thinkers. The priority 
of the nation state may be questioned by Liberal internationalists, but this is far from intuitive from 
the perspective of the word’s broader intellectual history. Relatively unused before 1950, the 
history of the word internationalism after 1950 is complicated by the emergence of a range of 
alternative terms like transnationalism, globalism, Wilsonism or supra-nationalism, which are 
deployed by authors precisely to achieve distance from a relationship to the ‘nation-state system, 
which they decry’.30 This is why it makes little historical sense to read internationalism as synonym 
for passage beyond the world of nations. 
                                                 
20 Meindert Fennema, ‘Some Conceptual Issues and Problems in the Comparison of Anti-Immigrant Parties in 
Western Europe’, Party Politics, 3:4 (1997), pp. 473–92; Fetzer (2000); Christian Joppke, ‘The retreat of 
multiculturalism in the liberal state: theory and policy’, The British Journal of Sociology, 55:2, pp. 237–57; Hartwig 
Pautz, ‘The politics of identity in Germany: the Leitkultur debate’, Race & Class, 46:4 (2005), pp. 39–52. 
21 Agnès Maillot, ‘Setting the Agenda? The Front National and the 2017 French Presidential Election’, Irish Studies 
in International Affairs, 28 (2017), pp. 45–56; Mayer (2013). 
22 Bustikova and Kitschelt (2009); Gerhard Wagner, ‘Nationalism and Cultural Memory in Poland: The European 
Union Turns East’, International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 17:2 (2003), pp. 191–212. 
23 Nicole Berbuir, Marcel Lewandowsky, and Jasmin Siri, ‘The AfD and its Sympathisers: Finally a Right-Wing 
Populist Movement in Germany?’, German Politics, 24:2 (2015), pp. 154–78. 
24 Chryssogelos (2010); Hadiz and Chryssogelos (2017); Bertjan Verbeek and Andrej Zaslove, ‘The impact of 
populist radical right parties on foreign policy: the Northern League as a junior coalition partner in the Berlusconi 
Governments’, European Political Science Review, 7:4 (2015), pp. 525–46; Andrej Zaslove, ‘Closing the door? The 
ideology and impact of radical right populism on immigration policy in Austria and Italy’, Journal of Political 
Ideologies, 9:1 (2004), pp. 99–118. 
25  ‘Trump, and American Decline’, The New York Times, (2018a);  ‘Trump’s Dangerous Global Retreat’, The New 
York Times, (2018b). 
26  ‘The Moral Rot That Threatens America’, The New York Times, (2018); Joppke. 
27 Zaslove (2004). 
28 Verbeek and Zaslove (2015). 
29 Jens Steffek, ‘Fascist Internationalism’, Millennium, 44:1 (2015), pp. 3–22. 
30 Warren F. Kuehl, ‘Concepts of Internationalism in History’, Peace & Change, 11:2 (1986), pp. 1–10.  
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Martin Wight noted that the revolutionary ‘principle of uniformity’ amongst nations was of use to 
‘ideologists’ of various kinds. It was put ‘into effect in a counter-revolutionist sense by Alexander 
and Metternich’, forcing theorists to admit ‘counter-revolutionism as a mode of revolutionism. 
Mazzini gave the principle a violent push’ such that ‘there would be no valid international society 
till all its members were nation states.’ It is Mazzini’s reactionary political thought, rather than 
Kantian liberalism, that underwrote the triumph of the principle of self-determination in 1919 and 
‘gave its driving force to Afro-Asian anti-colonialism.’31 In suggesting the need for 
internationalism to be examined on its own terms, Kuehl’s implication was that diverse iterations 
of the idea remain to be uncovered. 
 
In acknowledging the New Right as defined by a Reactionary Internationalism we address the 
ways in which the conduct of relations among international actors is central to the New Right’s 
philosophical machinery. At every discursive level, the international provides the key unifying 
frame for the loose assemblage of the New Right. Even cultural expressions surrounding New 
Right political formations refer to problematic international norms that must be reformed.32 The 
New Right see themselves as having an international agenda characterised by an emphasis on 
freedom to trade, negotiate or engage in conflict without the unjust limitations imposed by Liberal 
internationalist norms, which they refer to as ‘globalist’. This agenda is evident in the foreign 
policy programmes of Trump, Le Pen, Salvini, Orban, Putin, as well as the wider discourse around 
Brexit. Donald Trump’s statements do not suggest cutting international links, but rather a 
transactional mode of international relations that rejects rights-based norms and embraces 
difference in power as a logic of engagement.33  
 
The current prominence of these forces and their explicit desire to reconfigure international norms 
justifies analysing them as a form of internationalism with various localised manifestations. Their 
conceptual assemblage and public discourse cohere around common themes: resistance to Liberal 
norms, an account of their negative consequences, a cultural identity-based causal temporal frame 
and, once they capture the state, solutions provided by international normative change. Because it 
retains Liberalism as a key referent,34 we define the New Right as the contemporary expression of 
a reactionary trend within the internationalist tradition. Our examination follows from MacKay’s 
and La Roche’s call to retrieve the role of Reactionary International Theory in IR and their 
examination of 1920s and 1930s reactionary strategies.35 We advance this investigation by 
identifying a New Right project to restructure international norms, replacing liberal assumptions 
of universal humanity and its protection through institutions, with the promotion of inequality 
among identities. 
 
                                                 
31 Martin Wight, ‘An anatomy of international thought’, Review of International Studies, 13:3 (1987), p. 225. 
32 Nancy S. Love, ‘Back to the Future: Trendy Fascism, the Trump Effect, and the Alt-Right’, New Political 
Science, 39:2 (2017), pp. 263–8. 
33 The White House, ‘President Trump speech to UN General Assembly’, available at: 
{https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-72nd-session-united-nations-general-
assembly/} accessed 8 November 2018. 
34 Kuehl (1986), p. 6. 
35 Joseph MacKay and Christopher David LaRoche, ‘Why Is There No Reactionary International Theory?’, 
International Studies Quarterly. 
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Regular comparisons of contemporary New Right movements to 1930s ethnonationalisms 
highlight the role of social hatred, racism, xenophobia and violent discourses therein.36 However, 
while some New Right discourses and concepts originate in the 1920s-30s, the rhetorical 
association to Fascism can obscure how the New Right addresses the international relations of the 
2010s with solutions that are, even when nostalgic of the 1930s, markedly different. It is important 
to track how the New Right draws from both the history of nationalisms and from the Liberal 
internationalism it critiques, breaking with prior formulations of populist reaction like Fascism or 
post-Napoleonic counter-revolutionary and anti-populist realpolitik. Having engaged 
substantively with liberal internationalism,37 the New Right offers a distinct alternative vision. Far 
from seeking isolationism, the New Right has stepped into a battle over which norms should 
govern international relations. 
 
We find that the New Right’s alt-internationalist offering is defined by i) adoption of a resistant 
subjectivity grounded on a birth-culture identity; ii) a reactionary disposition to contemporary 
Liberal internationalist norms; and iii) a project to break loose from these norms to “liberate” the 
“natural” qualities of birth-cultures. In sum, there is a vision for the remaking of the international 
contained in the New Right, which binds together diverse groups and cultural formulations. 
International norms are dynamic, their legitimacy liable to rise and fall,38 which in our view means 
the New Right can be considered ‘norm entrepreneurs’ advocating a re-modulation of the 
relationship between the ‘society of sovereign states’ and the ‘global society of individuals’.39 This 
normative drive to return the international to a rightful, imagined to be prior, condition, is well 
instantiated in their call to privilege the rights of birth-cultures over the rights of international 
institutions.  
 
Our method of analysis draws upon poststructuralist approaches to analysing discourse,40 to make 
sense of New Right claims, positions and beliefs, including politicised narratives such as Trump’s 
use of ‘fake news’ to delegitimate opposition critiques. We seek to retrieve their underlying logic 
by comprehending them from within the New Right theories that produce and govern them. To do 
so we firstly deploy Genealogy, an approach to the history of ideas that follows how concepts 
change and are repurposed over time. Genealogical method identifies the breaks, disjunctures and 
transformations that mark the history of a thing, whether it be an idea, a discourse, a ritual or a 
social practice.41 The genealogy of New Right internationalism, in relationship to past nationalisms 
and fascism, shows continuity only alongside significant differences in their treatment of the 
international. Secondly, to show how contemporary New Right debates coalesce around 
Reactionary Internationalism, we deploy Foucauldian archaeological analysis. This method 
focuses on retrieving the specific systems of knowledge production at work in a single discourse, 
to reveal the mechanisms through which ideas govern and produce others. Archaeology prioritises 
detailed conceptual deconstruction of texts that, here, informs an assessment of how New Rights 
                                                 
36 Rosenfeld (2017). 
37 Glenda Sluga, Internationalism in the Age of Nationalism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). 
38 Moritz Kütt and Jens Steffek, ‘Comprehensive Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons: An Emerging International 
Norm?’, The Nonproliferation Review, 22:3–4 (2015), pp. 401–20. 
39 M. Frost, Global ethics: anarchy, freedom and international relations (Taylor & Francis, 2008). 
40 Specifically Foucauldian discourse analysis, as opposed to CDA à la N. Fairclough, ‘Critical discourse analysis as 
a method in social scientific research’, Methods of critical discourse analysis, (2001), pp. 121–138. 
41 Raymond Geuss, ‘Nietzsche and Genealogy’, European Journal of Philosophy, 2:3 (1994), pp. 274–92; Timothy 
Wilson, ‘Foucault, genealogy, history’, Philosophy Today; Charlottesville, 39:2 (1995), p. 157. 
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theory works in practice, engages with and contests other ideas, and how its precise internal 
mechanisms sit within wider genealogies of reactionary thought.  
 
This dual approach produces insights into how New Right concepts and discourses: a) produce 
political subjects; b) propose an analysis of the global addressing identity and economics; and c) 
how it seeks to change international norms. Further, Poststructuralism’s concern with 
conceptualising and accounting for intertextuality –links across and among texts of different types 
and sites– enables research into the multi-platform amorphous formations of New Right 
enunciations. This method links the discourses of politicians to online fora, the repeating memes 
and actors that multiply and diffuse it, and the speech-acts that bring it to the broader public. The 
method allows us to unpack discourses drawn from diverse political groups whilst making sense 
of their points of alignment and cohesion.   
 
In selecting the textual corpus for our analysis, our criteria includes discourses from the campaigns 
of New Right political formations established in the late 1990s-early 2000s, which, although not 
always officially incorporated (such as the Brexiteers and the Trump campaign, only officially 
coagulated in 2016), have existed in political and discursive terms for more than a decade, and 
have developed links among one another. We could term these movements first-generation New 
Right movements. Accordingly, this paper includes discursive data from the Brexit, Front 
National, Lega and Trump campaigns 2016-18. Longstanding links across these groups are 
identifiable by common adherence to the EU Parliament European Nations and Freedom Group 
(ENF), the Brexit and Trump Campaigns’ sharing of ideas and frequent references to each other 
as examples of ‘liberation’,42 Bannon’s recent promotion of an international coalition,43 public 
mutually-supporting political links such as between Bannon and Jacob Rees-Mogg,44 as well as 
explicit self-identification with the New Right or core New Right ideas.  
 
These first-generation New Right movements were selected because they pioneered a range of 
discourses and political logics, now deployed by a second generation of New Right movements in 
the late 2000s and 2010s. This includes AfD in Germany,45 Vox in Spain, PVV in the Netherlands, 
the Sweden Democrats, Poland’s PiS,46 and Orban’s Fidesz, which emerged more recently or 
joined New Right discourse in the 2010s on the back of the migrant crisis.47 These actors explicitly 
reference and draw heavily on the successes, rhetoric, strategies and even aesthetics of the first-
generation movements here analysed, and should be the future focus of research into the New 
Right. The research agenda initiated in this paper might be further extended through work 
expanding the empirical focus to assess the degree to which Reactionary Internationalism provides 
the philosophical machinery for populist movements worldwide. 
 
                                                 
42 Leave.EU, ‘Jacob Rees-Mogg calls on Brexit Britain to learn from @realDonaldTrump’, available at: 
{https://twitter.com/LeaveEUOfficial/status/1026146411476410368} accessed 7 August 2018. 
43 BBC News, ‘Bannon plan for Europe populist “supergroup” sparks alarm’, (2018). 
44 LBC, ‘Bannon: “Jacob Rees-Mogg Is One Of The Best Conservative Thinkers Globally”’,. 
45 Berbuir et al. (2015). 
46 Geneviève Zubrzycki, The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland 
(University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
47 Viktor Glied and Norbert Pap, ‘The “Christian Fortress of Hungary”’, Yearbook of Polish European Studies, 19 
(2016), pp. 133–49; Miklós Haraszti, ‘Behind Viktor Orbán’s War on Refugees in Hungary’, New Perspectives 
Quarterly, 32:4 (2015), pp. 37–40. 
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The first section of the paper locates the New Right assemblage within the history of nationalist 
thought, retrieving the continuities, discontinuities and shifts that justify its definition as a form of 
internationalism. The second examines how the birth-cultural definition of identity characteristic 
of the New Right relates to critique of Liberal internationalist norms. The third section analyses 
New Right explanations for grievances and their solutions before explaining these findings as a 
concerted project to replace rights-based internationalist norms with freedom of competition 
between birth-cultures, which we term Reactionary Internationalism. 
 
 
In amongst the history of nationalism  
 
This section traces the intellectual history of the New Right in relation to nationalist thought. This 
genealogical analysis entails investigating the background of these ideas, retrieving continuities, 
differences, and caesuras in the history of nationalism leading to the New Right. We specifically 
identify which concepts, intellectual mechanisms, modes of critique and solutions the New Right 
has or has not absorbed from preceding nationalist traditions. 
 
Classical nationalism assumes friction among identities as a natural condition underpinning 
conceptualisations of identity, survival, competition and hierarchy.48 The traditional nationalist 
hierarchy of rights is clearly apparent in contemporary discourses that allocate rights on the basis 
of identity.49 1920-30s nationalisms drew on the pseudo-scientific Geopolitical tradition pioneered 
by Kjéllen and Ratzel,50 to link geopolitical survival to birth and ethics through conceptualisations 
that linked razza (biologically-determined identity, not solely race) to the spirito of a nation (its 
immanent ethical basis), framing history, decadence, hierarchy and culture as variables produced 
by that relationship.51  
 
Classical nationalist discourses blamed modernity and its universalist norms –particularly identity, 
gender and individual rights– for endangering the nation. Bismarck, for example, framed 
constitutionalism and liberalism as self-inflicted existential weakness, arguing that ‘it is not by 
speeches and majority resolutions that the great questions of the time are decided […] but by iron 
and blood’. In this discourse the universality of individual rights hinders national power, which 
(framed as the capacity for violence), linked to national necessity, supersedes the rights of 
individuals. To this day, this discourse establishes universality of rights as a threat to national 
security or, in social contexts, the freedom to be strong against the weak, and is commonly 
                                                 
48 Carl Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth: In the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum (New York: 
Telos Press,U.S., 2003). 
49 Theresa May’s attacks on Human Rights and desire to allocate rights by political choice or identity are a good 
example; see BBC News, ‘May wants Human Rights Act axed’, (2011); BBC News, ‘Theresa May had plan to 
“deprioritise” illegal migrant pupils’, (2016). 
50 Alison Bashford, ‘Nation, Empire, Globe: The Spaces of Population Debate in the Interwar Years’, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 49:01 (2007), pp. 170–201; Geoffrey Parker, ‘Ratzel, the French School and the 
birth of Alternative Geopolitics’, Political Geography, 19:8 (2000), pp. 957–69; Ola Tunander, ‘Swedish-German 
geopolitics for a new century: Rudolf Kjellén’s’, Review of International Studies, 27:03 (2001), pp. 451–463. 
51 This was a core concept in Fascism, Kemalism, National Socialism and Francoism; Giulio Evola, ‘Sul problema 
della razza dello spirito’, Vita Italiana, 347 (1942); Franco Ferraresi, ‘Julius Evola: tradition, reaction and the radical 
right’, European Journal of Sociology, 28:1 (1987), pp. 107–51.  
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expressed through demands to establish identity and gender hierarchies by overturning ‘political 
correctness’.  
 
Fascist nationalism drew on these survival ‘requirements’ further to promote totalitarianism, erase 
dissent and optimise the nation for violence against others. 1930s Nationalists and Fascists 
believed in re-making nature, developing and bending it to the will of man. Mussolini, the Futurists 
or Primo de Rivera did not only seek to purify identity, but to create a new obedient national 
warrior subject, l’uomo fascista devoted to national imperative as dictated by the leader. ‘Fascist 
Man’ is born in the mind of the pioneering nationalist: he must be invented, moulded and made: a 
detailed vision of society beyond purifying identity from foreignness and traitors. This is why, to 
nurture spirito as the optimal realisation of biological identity, fascism featured revolutionary 
programmes for radical social change, beginning with a vision of people’s membership of society 
and the state that erased the social unit of the family –though not its biological role– in favour of 
state-corporatist social units that separated men, women and children, linking each to the state via 
work, dopolavoro (after-work) socialising, women’s collectives, youth organisations and the 
military.52  
 
Only one element of this conceptualisation remains in New Right thinking. If 1930s reactionary 
philosophy was grounded on the razza-spirito axiom and the programmatic move to heroically 
enact the potential of the race, the New Right retains the axiomatic logic but abandons the 
programme. Instead of constructing and programming the future, the New Right appears content 
to purify and ‘unshackle’ national identity – a passive approach to salvation. 
 
The New Right’s birth-culture axiom diverges from the Fascist razza-spirito, integrating race into 
a broader conceptualisation of identity mediated by the constructive role of culture in history. This 
identity remains circumscribed by birth, which explains why New Right politicians aggressively 
attack jus solis (citizenship for children of foreigners born in the national territory). Culture 
emerges as immutable and primordial, removing the need for active self-improvement, leaving 
only passive protection of cultural purity. Birth stands as the limit condition of culture, binding 
past and future belonging into existing membership. Race remains a part of birth-culture but, 
subsumed as an accident of birth, it does not need to be explicitly enunciated. This avoids legal 
restrictions and is how the New Right articulates racism without mentioning race.  
 
Birth-culture is at the core of the New Right’s electoral and discursive machinery. It is particularly 
evident in foundational texts such as de Benoist and Champetier’s internationally influential 
‘Manifesto: The New Right for the Year 2000’, cited by New Right nationalists like Bannon and 
Dugin. New Right thinking conceptually refutes the existence of humanity as a social and political 
category, arguing that ‘mankind as such does not exist, for its affiliation to humanity is always 
mediated by cultural belonging’.53 Identity is cultural, de Benoist argues,54 innate and determined 
from birth –as deterministic as race therefore– but articulated through a framework that absorbs 
                                                 
52 Giovanni Gentile and Benito Mussolini, ‘La dottrina del fascismo’, Enciclopedia Italiana, (1932); V. de Grazia, 
Consenso e cultura di massa nell’Italia fascista. L’organizzazione del dopolavoro (Roma-Bari, Laterza, 1981). 
53 Alain de Benoist and Charles Champetier, ‘Manifesto: The French New Right in the Year 2000’, Telos, 
115:Spring (1999), pp. 117–44; ‘Alain de Benoist en « soutien critique » à Marine Le Pen’. 
54 Alain de Benoist, Nous et les autres: Problèmatique de l’identité (Paris: Editions Krisis, 2007). 
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Evola’s normative identity (spirito) into a birth-determined immutable origin now articulated as 
culture.  
 
De Benoist’s ideas draw heavily on French anti-liberal late 19th-Century nationalists Charles 
Maurras and Maurice Barrès55 –the latter a key instigator of the anti-Semitic 1894-1906 Dreyfuss 
affair.56 Barrès grounded national belonging on a conceptualisation of culture that is determinant, 
immutable and ‘eternal’, and which defines the individual from birth through racially-enabled 
determinant nurture. Through this framework of cultural immanence, the birth-culture axiom 
defines nationhood and locates two threats to its survival: liberal norms and the presence of 
foreigners.57 Mazzini contemporarily embedded birth-culture into an international frame that 
predicated its survival on national particularism and, in a more nuanced reactionarism than his 
French contemporaries, reframed democracy as an enabler of national self-determination rather 
than individual emancipation. 58  Belief in the immanent and eternal quality of birth-culture, which 
only required defence from foreigners and Liberals, distinguishes this tradition from fascism and 
means that the revolutionary programme which fascism had for society is displaced onto the 
international as anti-liberal normative reaction. Crucially, the two conceptualisations remain 
compatible and contiguous, particularly on anti-liberalism.  
 
The immutable and immanent conceptualisation of culture grounds the role of birth and history in 
New Right identity politics.59 Their focus on numbers of migrants –rather than any other qualifier– 
betrays the logic that migrants have no agency as to their normativity and negative impact.60 Whilst 
the fascist race-spirit discourse constructed the individual Jew or race-enemy as threatening object 
of purification, the birth-culture discourse displaces normative agency from the individual to birth-
identity, and thus the individual migrant is not to blame but rather their identity is.  
 
This reveals how the birth-culture discourse incorporates international concerns. International 
norms are framed as impediments to solutions which follow logically from the birth-culture 
linkage. Proposed analytics and solutions tend to be peculiar to each domestic national case but 
share a critique of conspiratorial “internationalists” like George Soros and the liberal international 
norms that permit their operation. The temporal inscription of recently-arrived foreignness in the 
New Right’s 2010s anti-migration discourse underpins a mission to unravel international norms, 
such as European freedom of movement or UN obligations to refugees.61 This is how the passive 
                                                 
55 Alain de Benoist, Charles maurras et l’action française - une bibliographie (Niherne: Association Anthinea, 2002). 
56 Hannah Arendt, ‘From the Dreyfus Affair to France Today’, Jewish Social Studies, 4:3 (1942), pp. 195–240; 
Maurras Charles, Votre bel Aujourd’hui (Arthème Fayard, 1953); Jean-Pierre Rioux, ‘Maurice Barrès : « ma 
soumission à mon innéité »’, 1900: Revue d’histoire intellectuelle, 11:1 (1993), pp. 101–6. 
57 Maurice Barrès, Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme (1902);  Les traits éternels de la France (1917);  Étude pour 
la protection des ouvriers français : contre les étrangers (1893). 
58 For example in Gentile’s use of Mazzini’s ‘national determination’ frame; see Maurizio Viroli, As If God Existed: 
Religion and Liberty in the History of Italy (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 176; Giuseppe 
Mazzini, A Cosmopolitanism of Nations: Giuseppe Mazzini’s Writings on Democracy, Nation Building, and 
International Relations eds Stefano Recchia and Nadia Urbinati (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); 
Giuseppe Mazzini, Dei doveri dell’uomo (Milano: Classici Moderni, 2010). 
59 See conclusion in de Benoist (2007). 
60 The Telegraph, ‘Theresa May commits Tories to cutting net migration to the UK to the tens of thousands’, (2017). 
61 BBC News, ‘Italy says “No” to migrant-saving NGOs’, (2018); Alain de Benoist, Les démons du bien (Paris: 
Pierre-Guillaume de Roux Editions, 2013); Alain de Benoist, Au-delà des droits de l’homme (Paris: Pierre-
Guillaume de Roux, 2016). 
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(narratively nostalgic) mode of the birth-culture discourse ensures that Liberal internationalist or 
“globalist” norms are viewed as the overarching problem by the New Right. 
 
The transactional mode of international and economic engagement evident in the international 
behaviour of Trump, Salvini and radical Brexiteers, however, betrays the influence of a strand of 
the Liberal internationalist tradition they critique: economic neoliberalism. This suggests another 
fissure between the New Right and prior nationalist traditions. The transactionalism of the 1980s 
economic revolution led by Thatcher and Reagan focussed on liberating the economy from 
normative, legal, governmental and international constraints, a preference for supply-side 
economics through commodification of all activities, deregulation, and depoliticization of 
economics.62 Its evolutionary mode, critiqued as ‘creative destruction’,63 is passive: it assumes that 
once obstacles are removed, prosperous natural balance ensues. This led to contradictions within 
the New Right between supply-side universalism and ethnonationalist particularism that sees 
‘economic globalists’ like the Koch brothers as profiteering from Liberal internationalist norms.64 
 
This paradox was to some extent conceptually resolved in the 2010s, as the New Right began to 
form electorally successful national units. The ideas of Bannon and Brexiteers are interesting 
examples of this partial reconciliation, though this is less apparent in the Italian and French New 
Right. Supply-side theory, especially in its survivalist ethic of just success or failure,65 appears to 
have influenced the New Right by informing and updating ideas of struggle anchored in 19th-
Century Geopolitics. This survivalist logic is visible in the New Right's attacks on 'Social Justice 
Warriors' (#SJW, progressives) that, in their view, pervert nature by upholding weak subjects, 
particularly women and those of different birth-identity. The partial solution was evident in 
economic claims of ‘liberated’ trade and ‘increased prosperity’ during the Brexit referendum.66 
Contiguity is possible because economic failure is comparable to failure to survive through 
violence –in both theories considered fair and natural functions of freedom.  
 
Neoliberalism influenced New Right thought in three ways. Firstly, the New Right logic of 
liberation focuses on the destruction of Liberal international economic norms (like the European 
single market) perceived as constraining freedom through regulation, further distancing it from 
1930s programmatic or “high-modernist” solutions.67 Secondly, national economic survival has 
largely replaced violent survival, as evident in Bannon and Trump’s discourse and policy on trade 
with Mexico, Europe, and China.68 It is also visible in claims that Britain, no longer constrained 
by EU regulation, would triumph in international trade as it did before joining. The “Darwinism” 
of struggle between identities no longer draws on 1920-30s racial geopolitics of protection and 
                                                 
62 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); F. A. Hayek, 
Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); R. A. Mundell, International 
Economics (Macmillan, 1968). 
63 David Harvey, ‘Neo‐liberalism as creative destruction’, Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, 88:2 
(2006), pp. 145–58. 
64 BBC News, ‘Trump calls Koch brothers “a total joke”’, (2018). 
65 Hayek (1996), pp. 6–9. 
66 ‘Michael Gove: “The Facts of Life Say Leave”’, available at: {/michael_gove_the_facts_of_life_say_leave} 
accessed 9 October 2017a. 
67 James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999). 
68  ‘Steve Bannon interviewed by Charlie Rose’, (2017). 
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isolation, but rather seeks to be set free to achieve nature-given economic potential. Thirdly, and 
crucially, an alternative internationalism emerges at the heart of the New Right critique, which 
borrows from neoliberalism’s core logic. That logic, evident in 1980s economic reforms, drove a 
process of creative destruction to liberate capital from normative and institutional constraints as 
well as from future political or institutional policies.69 This revolutionary “mode” of reform70 seeks 
state power to dismantle and remove –rather than reform– normative structures, institutions and 
limitations.71 The New Right has adopted this method and logic, proposing in campaigns and 
enacting in office the abandonment or disestablishment of international normative frameworks, for 
example in trade (NAFTA, the EU), migration (European free movement), and legal structures 
recognising universal humans and their rights. 
 
The greatest area of neoliberal-New Right divergence is the extent to which to allow one’s identity 
to be harmed by economic failure.72 This accounts for differences between Brexiteers and Trump, 
and on the other side the continental New Right. As discussed in the following section in the 
context of survival, Brexiteers and Trump advocate a liberation of identity’s economic potential 
where failure is the just desert of the inadequate. However, continental New Right politicians like 
Le Pen, Salvini, and to some extent Steve Bannon, gravitate towards compensating for the 
misdeeds of ‘global internationalists’ with economic preferentialism. This includes Bannon’s 
‘Economic Nationalism’ or Le Pen and Salvini’s ‘economic patriotism’, which favours preferential 
economic treatment for nationals.73 This is framed, however, by the same logic of restructuring 
international norms to facilitate innate capabilities, which to a great extent avoids discursive 
contradiction. Furthermore, neoliberal methods of reform fit the New Right drive to deploy state 
power to overcome parliamentary and institutional limitations while citing this move as fulfilling 
popular will. For instance, Trump and Brexiteers frequently refer to their election/referendum 
results to discursively and practically bypass parliament and promote their normative revolutions.  
 
The manner and method of New Right politics are diverse, but clearly different from past 
nationalisms. New Right populism shares the logic of Fascist ‘mobilisation’,74 Communist 
‘collective agitation’,75 or French revolutionary levée,76 to outrage the public about specific 
grievances. The programme, as analysed, is mostly limited to removing hated norms, a logic then 
                                                 
69 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone Books - MIT, 2017). 
70 Wight (1987). 
71 Quinn Slobodian, Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2018a); Quinn Slobodian, ‘Opinion | Trump, Populists and the Rise of Right-Wing 
Globalization’, The New York Times, (2018b). 
72 Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity (Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), p. 30. 
73 FN, ‘Les 144 engagements présidentiels du Front National’, available at: 
{https://www.rassemblementnational.fr/le-projet-de-marine-le-pen/} accessed 10 August 2018; Lega, ‘Programma- 
Elezioni 2018’, available at: {https://www.leganord.org/il-movimento/politiche-2018} accessed 10 August 2018. 
74 Ernesto Laclau, ‘Fascism and ideology’, ARGUMENT, 21:SEP (1979), pp. 667–677; Giulio Sapelli, La 
cooperazione e il fascismo: organizzazione delle masse e dominazione burocratica (Lega nazionale cooperative e 
mutue, 1976). 
75 Richard Taylor, ‘A medium for the masses: Agitation in the Soviet civil war’, Soviet Studies, 22:4 (1971), pp. 
562–574. 
76 Daniel Moran and Arthur Waldron, The People in Arms: Military Myth and National Mobilization Since the 
French Revolution (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
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expanded into international normative reaction.77 At the electoral level, candidates gather support 
from various, sometimes contradictory nationalist, identitarian and economic libertarian sources, 
which is why informal electoral coalitions of radical and more moderate New Right groups are 
increasingly important. New Right campaigns tacitly accepted extremist support, including Brexit 
(Leave.EU), Trump 2016 (Alt-Right ‘fine gentlemen’), Le Pen 2017 (Génération Identitaire), 
Salvini 2018 (formally Fratelli d’Italia, informally Forza Nuova and Fiamma Tricolore). What 
binds these coalitions together is a shared internationalism; the belief that the sources of problems 
are international, and that solutions necessitate restructuring international norms to liberate birth-
culture’s innate potential. 
 
At the idea-making level, the New Right draws on networked micro-centres of outrage that actively 
refuse long-term coalescence with others and leadership, not least because focus on specific 
grievances makes support highly contingent. Gentile, Evola or Primo de Rivera would have not 
recognised this decentralised logic, considering their emphasis on total surrender of authority and 
initiative to a saviour leader. Despite the nostalgic use of fasci or swastika symbols, these dynamics 
suggest a new political and aesthetic process for coalescing and expressing ideas.78 A good 
example is a culture of transgression on the Right –which loops back, after Liberal critique, to 
claims of tyrannical political correctness by establishment conspirators79– that resonates more with 
1960s left-wing student movements or 19th-Century French 'dark' literary libertinism than rigid 
socially conservative schemes. 
 
IR theorists might be tempted to equate the international dimension of New Right thought with 
Samuel Huntington’s civilisation thesis.80 Similarities, however, are limited to xenophobia and 
existentialist fear of migration, rather than conceptual structure and history. Huntington reduces 
identity, culture and their attendant norms to religion, rather than the above-analysed birth-culture 
axiom. Huntington’s clash pits evangelical Christianity against millennial Islamic extremism 
because of their competing universalisms, which is anathema to New Right national particularism. 
Its intellectual history is parallel to the New Right’s in drawing on American 1990s ‘culture wars’, 
and they share a common predecessor in paleoconservativism,81 but its international dimension 
absorbs Bernard Lewis’ Occidentalist-Orientalist binary, which informs its grounding of norms on 
religious identity.82 This leads Huntington to foresee ‘civilizational blocs’ as vast regionalist 
alliances, contrasting with the transactionalist statist particularism of the New Right. While 
Huntington’s assertions of the Otherness of Islam resonate with New Right discourses and the 
birth-culture concept here outlined, his ‘observation’ of colliding civilisations is a symptom rather 
than a component of the emerging influence of early 1990s predecessors of the New Right.  
 
                                                 
77 ‘Bannon plan for Europe populist “supergroup” sparks alarm’ (2018); Alain de Benoist, Droite-gauche, c’est fini! 
Le moment populiste (Paris: Pierre-Guillaume de Roux, 2017). 
78 Nagle (2017), p. 28. 
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(London: Simon & Schuster, 2005). 
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paleoconservative Samuel T. Francis. See Joseph E. Lowndes, From the new deal to the new right: Race and the 
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82 See Edward Said, ‘The clash of ignorance’, The nation, 22:10 (2001), p. 3. 
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This genealogy has identified three key mutually constitutive New Right modes of thinking and 
their attendant discourses: passive identity definition and survival, with economic issues framed 
as identity conflict, and solutions discursively based on unshackling birth-culture through 
international normative reaction. Despite superficial similarities to 1930s nationalisms, the New 
Right draws more heavily on 19th-Century ethnonationalism based on ‘eternal’ cultures. Far less 
programmatic than their predecessors, they focus on unravelling ‘imperialist’ international norms, 
so as to ‘unshackle’ nations from restrictions on economic, identity or gender power. The impact 
of neoliberalism has replaced programmatic aspirations with the assumption that if “unnatural” 
restrictions are lifted the nation and its culture will thrive, an (apparently) passive ‘liberation’ mode 
that has seeped into normative, legislative and social realms. In confronting late modern 
grievances, the New Right promotes a fundamental shift in international normative regimes so as 
to unleash the natural power of cultural identities.  
 
 
Freedom, diversity and survival 
 
This section examines how the contemporary New Right defines identity and frames its survival 
in an international context. It shows the international reach of these ideas and evidences their logic 
through analysis of the discourses of Brexiteers and European identitarians. 
 
The 2016 Brexit campaign was split into the “official” Vote Leave campaign and Leave.EU, 
reflecting the uncomfortable alliances characteristic of New Right electoral politics. Vote Leave 
discourse focussed on normative identity by proposing binaries that forced self-definition as 
totalitarian or free. The main ‘choices’ for the electorate opposed British sovereignty against 
‘Soviet-style control freaks’ ‘ruling’ over British identity, ethics, tax, property law and even 
defence. Likewise, exclamations of ‘Britain’s a great country. Vote Leave’, ‘believe in Britain’ 
and ‘don’t talk down Britain’ confronted unpatriotic sentiment against belief in innate British 
capabilities.83 Concerning immigration, they claimed their position was ‘non-discriminatory’, a 
‘practical’ solution to ‘uncontrolled’ ‘numbers’, forbidden by ‘[t]he dogmatic defenders of the 
EU’s free movement rules’.84  
 
The right to reject universalism is the core driver of this discourse. Michael Gove, speaking for 
Vote Leave, elevated the right of the UK to discriminate or deport by identity, wealth, or risk, to 
an issue of ‘fundamental liberties’ and especially survival.85 This resonated powerfully with (false) 
claims of imminent Turkish accession to the EU and added an economic and security dimension 
where Brexit opposed ‘British families struggling to make ends meet’ to migrants who were only 
‘good for some of the multinationals funding the IN campaign’.86 International migration, they 
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claimed, drives scarcity in housing, healthcare, school places, even green space,87 and accused 
critics of ‘sneering at Brits who voice legitimate concerns about the crisis’, making migration an 
anti-establishment issue.88 
 
Leave.EU enunciated a discourse of indigenous survival more explicitly, highlighting that 
European countries like Hungary and Slovakia had closed borders, blaming the 2015 Paris attacks 
on migration rather than extremism.89 Seeking to ensure a ‘proper’ Brexit, Leave.EU blamed the 
2017 Westminster terrorist attack on migration,90 and framed Brexit’s success as an anti-elite 
‘kick-back against the status quo that leads to a popular revolt across the West’ –a common New 
Right discourse.91 In a show of solidarity demonstrating the internationalism of these ideas, 
Breitbart followed the Leave.EU campaign in detail. Linking the two campaigns, Michael Gove 
argued that ‘fundamentalist terror’ is provoked by Western ‘moral relativism’.92 
 
The Front National’s 2017 campaign also linked specific norms to culturally-framed identities. 
Echoing Vote Leave, it demanded a referendum ‘to liberate ourselves from the EU’s anti-
democratic rules’ and ‘institutional reform’ to deliver ‘national priority’ –discrimination in favour 
of French citizens.93 Radicalisation, it argued, results from allowing ‘ethnic or religious 
communities to coexist’ –for ‘Sunni Islam is incapable of defining right and wrong’. Blaming 
Liberal ideas that ‘discard the existence of French culture’, and it blamed ‘threats’ to women on 
Muslim immigration, advocated the abolition of Jus Solis, family reunion and a target of 10,000 
migrants per year.94  
 
Enunciating the New Right’s theory of ‘cultural diversity at the global scale’, FN expressed respect 
for all cultures, for ‘it is the existence of original cultures, each anchored and safe in its soil and 
population that makes the diversity of the world’, proposing ‘diversity’ as healthy segregation 
against ‘the disappearance’ that follows from ‘cohabiting in the same place’. This assumes a static 
vision of culture ‘that can only survive if each culture remains in its soil’. As part of measures to 
‘give real value to French citizenship’, naturalised ‘French citizens of African origin’ should 
assimilate ‘fully’, or face deportation.95 FN proposed an international normative shift, including 
ending multilateralism, shifting to unilateral or bilateral security, development, aid, and an 
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‘economic patriotism’ model similar to Bannon’s ‘economic nationalism’ discussed below. 
Echoing the US Alt-Right’s rejection of ‘white guilt’ in considering colonialism and slavery, FN, 
not unlike Boris Johnson, promotes defence of the positiveness of French colonialism.96  
 
French youth group Génération Identitaire holds a more militant and European perspective. In the 
2017 election they mobilised youth voters for Le Pen as the final opportunity to ‘save France’.97 
Génération Identitaire describes itself as the centre of a pan-European ‘resistance’ against 
‘enforced interbreeding’, ‘sexual perversion’ and ‘ethnic fracture’ of ‘our land, our blood, our 
identity’.98 Their campaigns seek to ‘defend’ French borders against ‘invaders’ and roll back 
‘colonisation’ of French cities with rallies in migrant neighbourhoods like St Denis, Paris.99 They 
seek pan-Western unity against the (‘May ’68’) international Liberal norms that destroy European 
identities by ‘promoting’ Islam, homosexuality, women’s and minority rights, migration, and 
‘interbreeding’.  
 
In Italy, Lega’s resistance to Liberal norms focuses on promoting identity birthrights. Lega 
opposed jus solis, claiming countless pregnant foreigners give birth in Italy ‘to steal Italian rights’ 
and ‘sneak’ in more migrants. Enacting the birth-culture axiom, Lega argued that granting 
citizenship to infants ‘without Italian parents and ancestors’ endangered Italians’ ‘demographic’, 
‘cultural’ and economic survival. Lega blamed vast youth unemployment on the immigrant 
‘invasion’ and, echoing de Benoist on the wrongs of ‘human rights ideology’, pledged to carry out 
mass deportations and outlaw assistance to refugees and migrants.100 To show their ‘Italians first’ 
campaign, at their annual festival in 2017 the party restricted parking for pregnant women to 
‘European heterosexual women only'.101  
 
Following their 2018 election victory, Salvini closed Italian ports to NGOs rescuing migrants in 
the Mediterranean and proposed a census and register of Roma people ‘to protect Italians’.102 
Lega’s journey from anti-Southern regional party to a New Right ethnonationalist party was openly 
discussed,103 and directly involved international New Right figures like de Benoist and later 
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Bannon.104 Like other New Right calls to dismantle international norms, Lega seeks to repeal the 
Mancino Law (banning fascism) as a ‘device used by globalists to conceal their anti-Italian racism 
as antifascism’.105 Likewise, Salvini proposed a referendum on leaving the Euro and recently 
blamed EU ‘diktats’ imposing ‘external constraints’ to ‘protecting Italian lives’ for the August 
2018 Genoa bridge collapse.106  
 
These discourses do not only establish and delimit identity. They seek to shift norms so as to enact 
an existentialist claim: exercise power on the basis of cultural identity so as to measure, ‘contain’, 
‘choose’, govern, or dispose of differentiated bodies and determine their fate. This is apparent in 
Trump’s position on DREAMERS and incarceration of migrant children. The logic animating 
these discourses is the right of cultures to survive, on the assumption that all identities seek the 
same at the expense of one another: a struggle for (primarily economic) survival, a “fair cause” 
that necessitates lifting the international norms that prevent its pursuit.  
 
New Right thinking understands intellectual or cognitive resistance as a necessary precursor to 
identity liberation. At stake here are the reasons why “fake news” are believed, why truth becomes 
contingent on who speaks and against whom. Its conceptual construction ties together ideas of 
indigenous birth-cultural survival to a frame of epistemological resistance. As Evola before him,107 
de Benoist identified modernism ‘embodied in’ the culture of Liberalism as its ‘dominant 
ideology’. The pursuit of cognitive resistance to Liberal ‘thought control’108 pulls together three 
intersecting pillars of the New Right project: (i) a self-conscious adoption of a resistant 
subjectivity; ii) a reactionary disposition to the Liberal globalism; and (iii) a project to capture the 
state as the means to dismantle the Liberal prison. This account is exemplified in the widespread 
use of the metaphor of the illusion-busting ‘Red Pill’ in the US Alt-Right to describe the experience 
of breaking with Liberal internationalist norms concerning for example race, gender and 
migration.109 
 
The birth-culture axiom is central to this resistance. As de Benoist put it: ‘Man is not born like a 
blank page. Every single individual bears the general characteristics of the species, to which are 
added specific hereditary predispositions.’ The capacity for subjectivity is tied to ‘this inheritance, 
which limits his autonomy and plasticity, but also allows him to resist political and social 
conditioning’. Binding human subjectivity to indigenous qualities implies that universalist norms 
are necessarily totalitarian, inasmuch as they efface the rooting of agency in a determined birth-
cultural historical particularity.110 This is why the New Right does not treat bio-cultural diversity 
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as a “burden” to be reduced, but ‘to be welcomed’, ‘maintained and cultivated’ through 
segregation. Indigenous diversity, and thus subjectivity, is what is placed at fatal risk by Liberal 
internationalism, requiring political action to sustain the particular against universal indifference.  
 
The reactionary argument for cultural indigeneity is central to 2010s white nationalist (‘White 
Civil Rights’) demands to protect European particularity as already extended to other indigenous 
identity groupings.111 This is enunciated as a ‘natural conservativism [by which any group is] 
inclined to prioritise the interests of their tribe’. Three common New Right arguments emerge from 
this. Firstly, as occurred in the Brexit campaigns, an appeal to its legitimation due to wide popular 
support. Secondly, like Le Pen and Salvini, defending the ‘logical’ claim that ‘separation is 
necessary for distinctiveness’ to be maintained. Thirdly, as Nick Land notes in his contribution to 
Alt Right thought, The Dark Enlightenment, fostering birth-cultural subjectivity can necessitate a 
bio-politics of ongoing ethno-cultural purification,112 which was apparent in the Génération 
Identitaire-linked perpetrator of the 2019 Christchurch attack. These three are far from self-
contained separate boxes, with evident interchange and continuity between them and a determined 
drive towards radicalisation as a function of exasperation with social and economic grievances.  
 
The rejection of international Liberal norms is underwritten by focus on the agency involved in 
their application. Modernity is an ‘inherent trend to degeneration or self-cancellation’, ‘done by 
people of a certain kind with, and not uncommonly to (or even against), other people, who were 
conspicuously unlike them.’113 A misguided universalism is identified, that ‘has been the main 
cause of [the West’s] subsequent attempts to convert the rest of the world’ and itself. Universalist 
norms are interpreted by the contemporary New Right as efforts to erase cultural identity and 
distinctiveness, with development ideology viewed as its latest iteration. Liberal internationalism 
is thus defined against embodied ethno-cultural particularity, as ‘the westernisation of the planet 
has represented an imperialist movement fed by the desire to erase all otherness by imposing on 
the world a supposedly superior model invariably presented as ‘progress’’.114  
 
Opposing universalism requires the construction of an alternative internationalism that embraces 
national particularity. This anti-universalist discourse is explicit in Bannon, Le Pen, Orban, and 
Salvini, as well as Putin, Xi, Erdogan and Modi. Ethno-cultural particularisms may collaborate but 
‘in a multipolar world, power is defined as the ability to resist the influence of others rather than 
to impose one’s own’.115 The New Right sees Liberal norms as eroding the capacity of indigenous 
cultures to compete, but also to subsist in their particularity. In nurturing the capacity to say no to 
the erasure of particularity under a logic of universal progress, resistance to Liberal 
internationalism underpins the capacity of ethno-culturally determined national identities to 
endure.116 The future, faced by the crisis integral to Liberal internationalist universalism, can only 
be saved by remembrance of cultural traditions (the ‘eternal’ 19th-Century birth-culture analysed 
above) and allowing for their collective defence. Even aid and knowledge transfer is rejected in 
favour of each cultural particularism becoming free to actualise its potential.  
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The New Right’s call for the re-connection of international politics with birth-cultures renders all 
global normative interference dangerous. In other words, to oppose Liberal internationalist norms 
is, for the New Right, to defend a particularist internationalism, which allows for those nations 
who wish to remember their culture to determine what is right for themselves. This is an argument 
resonant with classical expressions of communitarianism in IR theory and may be found in works 
by authors such as Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield, Hans Morgenthau or even Hedley Bull. 
What distinguished these classical IR communitarian scholars was domestic advocacy for Liberal 
political values. The ‘communitarian pluralism’ of the New Right can therefore claim that it 
updates a conservative tradition that always existed at the heart of internationalist thought. 
 
Implicitly or explicitly, a Mazzinian conceptualisation of national survival informs New Right 
demands for ethno-cultural diversity. In a world cured of oppressive universalism, defenders of 
national particularism believe themselves most ‘fit’ in a Darwinian sense to succeed. In this lens, 
the critique of Liberal internationalism has the function of asserting the value of inter-national 
diversity. This politics formulates an internationalist subject committed to a rejection of the 
universal as its constitutive ideal, whose agency is archaic, in being rooted in reactionary 
nationalist discourse around birth, culture and autonomy, and futurist, in its recognition that the 
international cannot be ignored or isolated from. This is a Reactionary Internationalism because 
the discourse rests on the global re-enchantment of particularity, restoring birth-cultures to their 
rightful place as determiners rather than victims of international history. 
 
 
Reactionary international norms? 
 
This section examines New Right explanations for contemporary grievances, their varying 
solutions and tensions among them. New Right theory and discourse make vast efforts to address 
market deficiencies, growing inequality, poverty and access to resources, albeit with varying 
interpretations of the role of markets. All point to an economy that has been taken out of the 
political debate and given over to unaccountable international decision-makers for the benefit of 
global Others. The influence of Hayekian neoliberalism was to some extent conciliated with 
cultural nationalism through the logic of dismantling Liberal internationalist norms to liberate 
identity’s potential. While they agree that that Liberal norms are a hindrance to our control of the 
economy, how they ought to be reconstituted remains an area of divergence. In this section, we 
address the diverse intersecting strands of New Right thought on the international economy, which 
tie together critiques of multilateralism as imperialist, with the anarchic accelerationism that 
characterised some elements of Trump’s campaign –excluding Bannon– and the identity-based 
nationalist protectionism of the latter, FN, and Lega.  
 
The Brexit and Trump campaigns argued for liberation from multilateral rules and bodies such as 
the EU or NAFTA. The Vote Leave campaign focussed on the possibility of greater prosperity, 
trade deals, budget flexibility and other advantages once ‘unchained’ from the EU thanks to 
Britain’s ‘natural’ qualities.117 The Brexit and Trump campaigns blamed binding multilateral 
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agreements for allowing others to thrive at their expense, with solutions focussing on a more 
radical application of Neoliberal economics and replacing multilateral compacts with bilateral 
arrangements. The claim in Trump’s case, to some extent evidenced by his renegotiation of 
NAFTA, was that bilateral agreements reward coercive power, while Brexiteers similarly 
sustained that unilateral and bilateral arrangements reward British strengths.118 The presumption 
is that institutionalised multilateral agreements are intrinsically a danger to the nation’s autonomy, 
whilst ad hoc bilateral or inter-national negotiations are less likely to inhibit self-determination. 
 
Trump’s political-economic discourse, however, features a further dimension. Combined with the 
New Right’s revival of 19th-century anti-democratic reactionarism with neoliberal methods, it 
includes strong echoes of anarcho-capitalist thought, sometimes referred to as corporatist 
accelerationism.119 Donald Trump frequently argued that he could be trusted to act uncorrupted by 
the influence of ‘special interests’, claiming ‘I'm so rich I can't be bought’.120 The anarcho-
capitalist strands of the American New Right, to which this argument seems to have appealed, 
seem diametrically opposed to calls by Le Pen, Salvini, de Benoist, Orban or Bannon calls to 
defend illiberal democracy through separation of wealth and power. Anarcho-capitalist ideas have 
been present among post-Hayekian libertarian economists for some time and may be considered 
contiguous.121 Strands of libertarian thought appear amongst various New Rights groups in Europe 
and America and share with cultural identitarian and economic nationalists only the reactionary 
critique of Liberal internationalism. 
 
New Right Libertarians treat social decay as a function of the failure of Liberal Internationalism’s 
globalisation of democracy as a political project. As Thiel, Sea-Steading advocate, founder of 
Paypal and CIA data-mining firm Palantir, explains: ‘the great task of Libertarianism is to find an 
escape from politics in all its forms’.122 The New Right-accelerationist answer is to acknowledge 
the mythic nature of democracy, which is seen as a reality suppressed only by the constant effort 
of a dedicated ‘media-industrial complex’. They advocate surrender of the management of society 
to those who already control the actual levers of power: ‘[s]ince winning elections is 
overwhelmingly a matter of vote buying’ libertarians ‘have been looking for something else 
entirely: an exit’. That exit takes the form of ‘neocameralist’ authoritarian governance: with the 
state viewed as a corporation legitimised by efficacy in delivering value to its shareholders. Nick 
Land suggests the closest contemporary examples of how such a reactionary vision might be 
realised are Hongkong or Singapore, which: 
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appear to provide a very high quality of service to their citizens, with no meaningful 
democracy at all. They have minimal crime and high levels of personal and economic 
freedom. They tend to be quite prosperous. They are weak only in political freedom, and 
political freedom is unimportant by definition when government is stable and effective.123 
 
This strand of New Right thought proposes a future stripped of Liberalism’s first creation, 
democracy, whose death is an inevitable consequence of its globalisation and subsequent 
demonstration of Liberal ineptitude. Since democracy is deemed a farce acting only on behalf of 
Liberal internationalist norms, all that remains in question is how much of cultural tradition and 
particularity can be saved from an inevitable global crisis. This is contiguous with Neoliberal 
suspicion of democratic control over business,124 capital and profit, both necessitating and 
proposing an escape from democracy altogether. It is easy to see how a radical reaction against 
precedent, shaped as populist authoritarianism, is framed in this discourse as the ‘escape route’ 
back to a social contract rooted in national particularity.125 
 
Bannon, Salvini or Le Pen advocate for ethno-identity’s control over the economy. There are 
clearly tensions between the economic theories of anarcho-libertarians and cultural identitarians 
such as these, but they share a commitment to the restoration of the nation as the dominant actor 
in international relations. Salvini, Le Pen and Bannon blame economic hardship on political 
choices that surrendered the economy to ‘globalist’, unaccountable unelected operators enabled by 
Liberal internationalist norms and institutions. Le Pen, for example, accused Macron of being the 
‘agent’ of an internationalist elite ‘programme’ and ‘networks’, equating a vote for him as a 
‘VOTE FOR THE $YST€M’ (in English in the original), highlighting his former affiliation to 
Rothschild Bank as part of his ‘multiculturalism against French secularism’.126 Further, they target 
multilateral ‘restrictions’ like membership of rules-based bodies curtailing agency such as 
NAFTA, the Euro or the ‘Soviet-like’ EU.127 This drive to ‘liberate’ identity from shared economic 
norms is contiguous with the rejection of multilateralism and human rights.128 What is due to 
replace it, called ‘economic nationalism’ by Bannon and ‘economic patriotism’ by Le Pen and 
Salvini, is vague, sustained by the assumption that sovereign control over norms, by privileging 
nationals for instance, will fix economic issues. The critique of multilateral institutions like the 
EU, UN, or WTO can take accelerationist or national protectionist forms, but both are underwritten 
by the claim that once free from constraining norms, national culture and economics will flourish 
due to natural capabilities.  
 
These two economic visions are contradictory. How they are reconciled is key. As is evident in 
the case of Trump, the role of the truth-telling patriot can provide some discursive reconciliation 
by governing the very believability of information, particularly in critiques which highlight 
contradictions. This leader, defined by willingness to disrupt the liberal ‘establishment’, ‘political 
correctness’ and other norms, is often discursively familiarised –Marine, Boris, Nigel, or The 
Donald– and understood as willing to enunciate the experience of non-elites. When these figures 
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achieve a truth-teller role, they define through their representational frame which information is 
believable or not.129 This is why the Trump administration’s ‘alternative facts’ and Gove’s ‘enough 
of experts’ are powerful informational moments. They ordered believability by faith in the truth-
teller, itself defined by faith in their defence of identity (‘don’t talk Britain down’) against identity-
treacherous opponents (‘fake news’ or Brexit ‘pessimists’). The anti-elitism characteristic of 
populist movements and politicisation of credibility are not new,130 but in New Right discourse 
they are supercharged by the framing of truth as defined by patriots’ identity loyalty against Liberal 
internationalism.  
 
New Right critiques of multilateralism and the cases for economic and cultural patriotism analysed 
should be understood from the perspective of normative entrepreneurialism. As Sikkink and 
Finnemore demonstrated, international norms can change due to the work of norm 
entrepreneurs.131 The consecration of the rights of global society in postwar Liberal internationalist 
institutions increased the costs of violating liberal internationalist norms, rendering the wholesale 
dissolution of the existing normative architectures unlikely.132 New Right reactionary norm 
entrepreneurs instead seek to reweave the fabric of international norms to reposition the obligations 
of states as derived from a patriotic responsibility to liberate the potential of birth-cultures.  
 
Trump’s 2018 speech to the UN provided a clear articulation of this Reactionary Internationalist 
vision. Trump lauded the UN as a home in which distinct cultures could ‘choose independence 
and cooperation over global governance, control, and domination’ and the ‘global compact on 
migration’. Trump celebrated US withdrawal from trade deals, institutions such as the human 
rights council, and questioned the legitimacy of the ICC, calling instead for all to ‘embrace the 
doctrine of patriotism’ to defeat ‘the ideology of globalism’. Securing the diversity of nations 
should be the object of the UN, Trump argued, ‘[a]nd so we must protect our sovereignty and our 
cherished independence above all. When we do, we will find new avenues for cooperation 
unfolding before us’.133 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Overturning Liberal internationalist norms binds together New Right ideas, discourses, and 
political movements. Despite clear contradictions, for instance on the economy between Salvini’s 
birth-rights, free-trade Brexiteers or Anarcho-capitalist libertarians, we find that they are coherent 
insofar as they occupy contiguous locations in the spectrum of how to proceed in the 
revolutionisation of international norms. They share the assumption that liberation from Liberal 
internationalism will herald a “natural” order where identity’s strength will be unleashed, its mettle 
tested, and the deserving succeed. Cohesion around a critical vision where international normative 
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destruction is the solution makes Reactionary Internationalism the key conceptual, discursive –
and policy– frame uniting the New Right.  
 
Genealogical study found that these ideas evolve out of classical nationalist principles, in 
conceiving a historically immutable ethno-cultural identity conceptualised as birth-culture. Birth-
culture grounds New Right thinking about policy, opposition to liberal modernity and its norms as 
a betrayal of the Self. This grounds discourses advancing a protective return to the Self at the 
expense of hindering internationalist norms or actors. Rather than descending simply from 1920-
30s nationalisms, New Right thought draws upon the 19th Century nationalist tradition best 
represented by Mazzini, Barrès, and Maurras, as well as politicians like Napoleon III and 
Bismarck.  
 
New Right departures from classical nationalisms are significant. Its suspicion and pessimism as 
to Liberal modernity are not invested principally on democracy, but on internationalist norms –
which, in certain circumstances, includes democracy. Their salvation politics are influenced by the 
neoliberal drive to unchain the gods, raising normative destruction to a core prescription. However, 
liberation remains passively grounded on identity, making faith in natural superiority a key driver. 
This is distinct from 1920-30s nationalisms, which had extensive and pervasive plans to remodel 
people, society, and country. 1930s violent survivalism is replaced with an economic version that 
accepts international interconnectedness and interdependence –Trump, Brexiteers, Le Pen and 
Salvini don’t want to end trade, only demand better terms.  
 
Unlike 1930s nationalists, the New Right do not seek isolation from the rules, but their remaking 
around unilateral sovereignty, replacing multilateralism with transactions that reward power. It 
proposes the unravelling of the rights-based norms that govern much of international relations 
(equality of rights among states, or human rights for example). Mussolini, Evola and Marinetti 
were not afraid of isolation to create the perfect ‘fascist man’ and society. Conversely, Trump, 
Brexiteers and the Continental New Right want to reconstitute the international rules of the game. 
The movements here examined anticipate a greater share of the profits of global wealth and trade 
by overturning norms that in their view limit their potential. Much as in Hayekian theory, the 
market once set free achieves balance and fairness, the New Right’s national identity once set free 
from normative burdens like NAFTA or the EU, will achieve its natural potential.  
 
Reactionary Internationalism is an internationalist vision. Though unfamiliar, it is projected as the 
basis of a more just international relations where innate birth-cultural and economic quality will 
triumph, as exemplified by the buccaneering claims of Brexiteers who demand only the freedom 
to set forth to the world. Though often criticised as withdrawal, it is proposed as a global model. 
If, as we argue, we gauge its influence from a Reactionary Internationalist perspective, it is evident 
that a remarkable number of political movements around the world adhere to this core tenet, from 
Putin to Xi, who also demand to be set free from –at least some– international norms as the means 
to success. Their claim to identity’s right to overturn international norms has been rewarded with 
electoral success, whether independently as in the case of Lega, or conquering conservative 
movements as with the British Conservative and American Republican Parties.  
 
The vision of the international that results places survivalist cultural geopolitics as the main 
conceptual frame of reference for international relations. This is evident in the renegotiations of 
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international norms currently driven by New Right actors in the US, Britain, and Italy, who appear 
to relish the opportunity to dismantle the international norms that bind them. In support of our 
argument that this constitutes an ‘other’ internationalism, New Right actors do not conceive of 
each other as threats, but rather remain focussed on a collective struggle against international 
norms and institutions. Even as they agree on and unite around the need to dismantle Liberal 
international norms, the assumption remains that among them there must be victors and defeated 
in the world of total sovereignty they imagine. 
 
Finally, temporal pessimism is more important for the New Right than it ever was in past 
nationalisms. 1890s nationalists believed that global European power might be corrupted by 
liberalism, and thus projected and enacted a reactionary salvation of cultural permanence; 1930s 
fascists detested modern decadence and planned for an alternative modernity that aggrandised 
identity to epic proportions. Conversely, the New Right vision of the national and international is 
entirely framed by a reactionary imaginary. Reactionary Internationalism presupposes an 
international already at breaking point and sees its collapse as an opportunity for pure identity to 
emerge as salvation, informing interpretation of crises as resulting from normative failure and 
limiting solutions to normative destruction. This is why some Brexiteers are happy to simply 
“crash out” of the EU without any subsequent deal: Reactionary Internationalism is the post-Brexit 
plan. 
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